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SEC Regulation of Investment
Company Investments in
Securities Related Businesses
Under the Investment Company
Act of 1940
Lawrence P. Stadulis and
Timothy W. Levin*
Section 12(d)(3) of the Investment Company Act of 1940
(the "Investment Company Act")1 prohibits registered
investment companies from acquiring securities or other
interests in issuers engaged in securities related
businesses, such as brokers, dealers, underwriters or
investment advisers. 2 The legislative history of the
Investment Company Act is virtually silent concerning the
intended scope and purpose of section 12(d)(3). Despite
this fact, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"Commission" or "SEC") and its staff historically have
interpreted section 12(d)(3) to be "one of several
provisions, which taken together, were designed to prevent
investment companies from being organized, operated,
managed, or their portfolio securities selected in the
interests of brokers, dealers, underwriters, and investment
advisers."3  Consistent with this philosophy, the
* Mr. Stadulis is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius LLP and Mr. Levin is an associate in that firm's
Philadelphia office.
' 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d)(3) (1999).2 Section 12(d)(3)'s prohibitions do not apply to pooled investment
vehicles excepted from the definition of "investment company" under
section 3(c) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("Investment
Company Act") or exempted from registration under section 6 of the Act.
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(c) and 80a-(6) (1999). For example, section 12(d)(3)
does not apply to private investment companies excluded from the
definition of Investment company under sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7).
3Exemption for Acquisition by Registered Investment Companies of
Securities Issued by Persons Engaged Directly or Indirectly in
Securities Related Businesses, Investment Company Act Release No.
13,725, 49 Fed. Reg. 2912 (Jan. 24, 1984) (hereinafter Investment
Company Act Release No. 13,725).
1
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Commission and its staff have sought to apply section
12(d)(3) to a broad range of investments by investment
companies in securities related businesses, including
certain businesses that fall outside of the section's literal
terms.
At the same time, the Commission and its staff
periodically have reexamined "the purposes underlying
section 12(d)(3) and changes in the securities industry
since 1940" and determined to exempt certain acquisitions
believed not to raise the same types of concerns that the
section was designed to address. 4 The most notable
exemption is contained in Investment Company Act rule
12d3-1,5 which the Commission originally adopted in 1964
as rule 12d-16 and substantively amended in 19847 and
again in 1993.8
This article traces the legislative and administrative
history of section 12(d)(3) and rule 12d3-1. The first
section provides an overview of section 12(d)(3). The
second section reviews the sparse legislative history of the
section, as well as some of the more general concerns
pertaining to investment company relationships and
transactions with securities related businesses that
prompted Congress to enact the Investment Company Act.
The second section also examines various rationales that
the Commission and its staff have advanced since 1940 to
explain the policy and purpose underlying section 12(d)(3).
4 Exemption of Acquisitions of Securities Issued by Persons Engaged
in Securities-Related Businesses, Investment Company Act Release No.
19,716 (Sept. 16, 1993). 58 Fed. Reg. 49,425 (Sept. 23, 1993)
(hereinafter Investment Company Act Release No. 19,716).
5 17 C.F.R. § 270.12d3-1 (1999).
6 See Interests in Firms Engaged in Business as Brokers, Dealers,
Underwriters, and Investment Advisers, Investment Company Act
Release No. 4044 [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
77,119, at 82,061 (Sept. 4, 1964) (hereinafter Investment Company Act
Release No. 4044).7 See Exemption for Acquisition by Registered Investment Companies
of Securities Issued by Persons Engaged Directly or Indirectly in
Securities Related Businesses, Investment Company Act Release No.
14,036 (July 13, 1984), 49 Fed. Reg. 29,362 (July 20, 1984) (hereinafter
Investment Company Act Release No. 14,036).
8 Investment Company Act Release No. 19,716, supra note 4.
2
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The third section analyzes the specific elements of section
12(d)(3), as well as Commission and staff interpretations
under the section. The fourth section examines the
administrative history of rule 12d3-1, the terms of the
rule, Commission and staff interpretations thereunder,
and recent SEC exemptive orders. The fifth section briefly
reviews SEC enforcement proceedings under section
12(d)(3) and rule 12d3-1.
The final section of the article concludes that, for the
most part, the Commission and its staff have interpreted
and applied section 12(d)(3) in accordance with the first,
and perhaps the most fundamental, canon of statutory
construction - "when language is clear and unambiguous
it must be held to mean what it plainly expresses." 9 The
section, however, also addresses one instance in which the
literal terms of the section have been disregarded in
furtherance of what the Commission and its staff perceive
to be the policy and purpose underlying section 12(d)(3).
While this departure from the plain meaning rule appears
at first blush to be somewhat defensible given the
Commission's unique investor protection mission, a
careful analysis of the Investment Company Act legislative
history indicates that it contravenes another important
rule of statutory construction - that the literal terms of a
statute should be disregarded only "if the plain meaning of
the words of the statute is at variance with the policy of the
statute or if there is a clearly expressed legislative
intention contrary to the language of the statute."10 A
careful review of the Investment Company Act legislative
history shows that a plain reading of section 12(d)(3) is not
clearly at variance with either the policy underlying the
section or the expressed legislative intent.
9 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (5th ed. 1992) (hereinafter SUTHERLAND).
10 Id.
3
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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 12(d)(3) prohibits registered investment
companies and companies controlled by such registered
investment companies from "purchasing] or otherwise
acquir[ing] any security issued by or any other interest in
the business of any person who is a broker, a dealer, is
engaged in the business of underwriting, or is either an
investment adviser of an investment company or an
investment adviser registered under [the Investment
Advisers Act of 19401....,1 Section 12(d)(3) provides that
these prohibitions do not apply to the acquisition of
securities of a corporation all of the outstanding voting
securities of which (other than short-term paper, bank
loans and directors' qualifying shares) are, or after
acquisition will be, owned by one or more registered
investment companies, if such corporation is primarily
engaged in the business of underwriting and distributing
securities issued by other persons, selling securities to
customers, or any one or more of such or related activities
and if the gross income of such person normally is derived
principally from such business or related activities.
The effect of the exception in section 12(d)(3) is to permit
investment companies to acquire securities of a wholly
owned underwriting subsidiary. This is consistent with
other provisions of the Investment Company Act which,
with one limited exception, do not prohibit investment
companies from directly engaging in the securities
underwriting business. 12 Thus, the exception to section
I The term "control" is defined in Investment Company Act section
2(a)(9) as the "power to exercise a controlling influence over the
management or policies of a company...." For purposes of this
definition, a person is presumed to control another person if it "owns
beneficially, either directly or through one or more controlled
companies, more than 25 per centum of the voting securities" of such
other person. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9) (1999).
2 See, e.g., Investment Company Act section 10(o (prohibiting
registered investment company from purchasing security during
existence of underwriting or selling syndicate if certain enumerated
persons or their affiliates serve as principal underwriter, except where
investment company, itself, is principal underwriter of securities). 15
U.S.C. § 80a-10(0(1999).
4
Villanova Journal of Law and Investment Management, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vjlim/vol2/iss1/2
(VOL. 2:9 2000) SEC REGULATION OF INVESTMENTS 13
12(d)(3) merely recognizes that "if investment companies
were permitted themselves to engage in the business of
underwriting, there was no reason why, and possibly it
was more desirable that, they should conduct this
business through an underwriting subsidiary."
13
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. SECTION 12(d)(3) LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
There is very little direct commentary in the legislative
history of the Investment Company Act concerning the
intended scope and purpose of section 12(d)(3). The
original Senate version of the bill, which ultimately led to
the enactment of the Act, provided in section 12(c)(2) that
[ilt shall be unlawful for any registered investment
company to purchase or otherwise acquire any security
issued by, or any other interest in the business of ...
any person who is a broker, dealer, underwriter,
manager, or investment adviser, unless (A) such person
is a corporation all of the outstanding securities of which
(other than short-term paper) are, or after such
acquisition will be, owned by such investment company;
The one limited exception is contained in Investment Company Act
section 12(c), which prohibits a "diversified" investment company from
making any commitment as underwriter, "if immediately thereafter the
amount of its outstanding underwriting commitments, plus the value of
its investments in securities of issuers (other than investment
companies) of which it owns more than 10 per centum of the
outstanding voting securities, exceeds 25 per centum of the value of its
total assets." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(c) (1999). The term "diversified
company" is defined in Investment Company Act section 5(b)(1) as a
management Investment company meeting the following requirements:
At least 75 per centum of the value of its total assets is represented
by cash and cash items (including receivables), Government
securities, securities of other investment companies, and other
securities for the purpose of this calculation limited in respect of
any one issuer to an amount not greater In value than 5 per centum
of the value of the total assets of such management company and to
not more than 10 per centum of the outstanding voting securities of
such issuer.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b)(1) (1999).
'3 Alfred Jaretzki, Jr., The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 Wash.
U. L.Q., 303, 326 (1940).
5
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and (B) the business of such person is confined to
activities in which such registered company itself may
lawfully engage. 14
During the Senate hearings, David Schenker, the
principal draftsman of the bill stated that
Section 12(c)(2) merely states that an investment
company cannot buy an interest in a brokerage firm, a
distributing company, or an investment banking house.
It goes further and says that if it is engaged in the
underwriting business itself - if engaged in that
business through a wholly owned subsidiary - it is
permissible to do so.
You can see the reason for that. They may not want to
subject all the assets of the investment trust to the risks
of the underwriting business. So we see no difficulty if
they avail themselves of the corporate fiction and limit
their liabilities to the amount of money they want to
invest. So we say, if you want to go into the underwriting
business and want to do it through the wholly owned
subsidiary, there is no difficulty with that situation. 15
Aside from this one statement, both the Senate and
House hearings on the proposed legislation are silent
concerning the purpose of section 12(d)(3). The Senate
report accompanying a later version of the bill, however,
states that
Although investment companies are in general
prohibited from acquiring securities of persons engaged
in the brokerage business or in the business of
underwriting and dealing in securities, provision is
made to permit investment companies, either alone or
jointly with other investment companies, to purchase
stock of a company engaged primarily in the business of
underwriting and distributing securities and to acquire
14 Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on S.3580
Before the Subcomm. On Securities and Exch. Of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 76th Cong. (3d Sess. 1940).
15 Id. at 243.
6
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stock of a company formed to engage in the business of
furnishing new capital to industry, financing
promotional enterprises and similar activities. It is
hoped that investment companies will soon jointly form
such a company.' 6
This statement reflects the fact that the Commission and
the investment company industry agreed to add a new
provision to section 12 in a later version of the bill 'which
may encourage the opening up of the capital markets."
7
This provision, which ultimately became section 12(e) of
the Investment Company Act, "states that a group of
investment companies can buy an interest in a company to
be formed where the primary business of this company
shall be to promote industry, finance industry, underwrite
and make loans."'8 There do not appear to be any other
meaningful statements in the legislative history directly
addressing section 12(d)(3).19
B. GENERAL LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INVESTMENT
COMPANY ACT
Despite the dearth of legislative history directly relating
to section 12(d)(3), the legislative history of the Investment
Company Act in general contains numerous references to
concerns uniquely associated with investment company
relationships and transactions with securities related
businesses. For example, one of the principal reasons
Congress enacted the Investment Company Act was that
"[birokers, security dealers, investment bankers, and
commercial banks are in a position to dominate ...
investment companies; and thus, when they are
16S. Rep. No. 76-1775, at 15-16 (1940) (hereinafter Senate Report).
17 Id. See also Hearings Before a Subcomn of a Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce. 76th Cong. 3d Sess. 113-114 (1940).
19 The report accompanying the House version of the bill merely states
that this provision "prohibits investment companies from acquiring
securities of persons engaged in the brokerage business or in the
business of underwriting or dealing in securities ... " H.R. Rep. No.
76-2639, at 16 (1940).
7
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unscrupulous, to advance their own pecuniary interests at
the expense of the investment companies and their
security holders."20 In fact, section I of the Act, which
contains the findings and declaration of policy of
Congress, expressly states that the national public interest
and the interests of investors are adversely affected "when
investment companies are organized, operated, managed,
or their portfolio securities are selected ... in the interest
of underwriters, brokers, or dealers . .."21
The specific types of concerns that Congress associated
with investment banking businesses are principally set
forth in the Commission study of the investment company
industry that ultimately led to the introduction of the
Senate bill into Congress (the "Investment Trust Study').
In general, Congress was concerned that an investment
banker might be more concerned with the receipt of sales
loads on the sale of investment company shares and
commissions on the purchase and sale of portfolio
securities, as well as the opportunity to dump illiquid
securities in the investment company, than in providing a
service to the public. 22
2 0Senate Report at 7, supra note 16.
21 Investment Company Act section 1(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-I(b)(2)
(1999).
22 The Investment Trusts Study expressed the following concerns
about the motivations of the investment banking community in
establishing investment companies.
The underwriting and distribution of the securities issued at
organization, and from time to time thereafter, by an investment
company, constituted a source of business to a sponsor who was an
investment banker or securities distributor. Sponsors also were able
to utilize investment companies as a means of selling indirectly
securities which could not be directly sold on the market, by placing
non-marketable security issues in the portfolios of investment
companies and then making an offering to the public of the more
salable shares of the latter. The distribution activities of security
dealers were particularly augmented through the continuous sales
campaigns usual in the operation of fixed and semifixed trusts and
"open-end" investment companies.
A steady flow of brokerage commissions was implicit in the
organization and operation of investment companies, since their
portfolio activities required, almost invariably, the continual buying
and selling of securities. ... For the investment banker sponsor, the
purchasing power of large pools of liquid funds accumulated by the
8
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The concerns that Congress associated with commercial
banking businesses principally stemmed from
arrangements where such businesses organized and
operated investment companies as securities affiliates.
The sphere of activity of these securities affiliates
embraced the following: "wholesaling and retailing of
security issues; serving as holding and finance companies
in carrying blocks of securities, for control or otherwise,
which the bank could not or would not list among its own
investments; assuming such loans and investments of the
parent bank which might prove doubtful and nonliquid;
supporting the market in the bank's own stock; and finally
acting as investment companies in buying and selling
securities for investment or speculative purposes.
23
C. SEC ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
Since 1940, the Commission and its staff have advanced
a number of explanations of the underlying policy and
purpose of section 12(d)(3). Some of these rationales are
clearly supported by the literal terms of section 12(d)(3),
while others seem to be based more on the policy and
purposes underlying the Investment Company Act as a
whole. Each of these rationales is discussed below.
investment company was valuable not only to acquire securities
underwritten by such sponsor and thereby to increase the latter's
underwriting capacity, but also, at times, to take over blocks of
securities in which the capital of such sponsor might have become too
heavily involved. Furthermore, an opportunity to achieve new
banking connections was constantly presented through the sponsor's
access to and influence on the companies represented in the
investment company portfolio.
There were many less tangible but none the less valuable
advantages and benefits to persons engaged in the securities
business inherent in the management of large pools of liquid funds
and the control of blocks of securities, such as opportunities for
reciprocal business, patronage, power to influence or to participate in
the management of the affairs of portfolio corporations, and the
prestige attendant upon the successful management of the
investment company.
Report on the Study of Investment Trusts and Investment Companies,
H.R. Doc. No. 707, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938), Part I, at 76-77
(hereinafter Investment Trust Study).
2Id. at 94.
9
Stadulis and Levin: SEC Regulation of Investment Company Investments in Securities Re
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
18 VILLANOVA JOURNAL OF LAW AND INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
1. Engaging in Diverse Financial Activities
The Commission's first public statement concerning the
purpose of section 12(d)(3) was in a 1946 notice of an
application requesting an order that a registered
investment company had ceased to be an investment
company within the meaning of the Investment Company
Act.24 The SEC stated in that notice that section 12(d)(3)
"obviously [is] intended to prevent operating investment
companies from engaging in diverse financial activities in
conjunction with persons other than investment
companies. ... "25 This rationale was certainly consistent
with the terms of the section.
2. Entrepreneurial Risk
The Commission's next public statement concerning the
intended scope and purpose of section 12(d)(3) appeared
approximately 38 years later in the release proposing
Investment Company Act rule 12d3-1.2 6 The Commission
stated in this release that the purpose of section 12(d)(3)
was "to prevent investment companies from exposing their
assets to the entrepreneurial risks of securities related
businesses." According to the release, the problem was
that in 1940 most securities related businesses were
organized as private partnerships. To protect investment
company shareholders from bearing the risks associated
with general partnership interests, Congress restricted
investment in securities related businesses. 27
There is nothing in the section 12(d)(3) legislative
history, the general legislative history of the Investment
24 In the Matter of Paciftc Coast Mortgage Co., 22 SEC 829, 832 (1946).
25Id. at 832.
2 6 Investment Company Act Release No. 13,725, supra note 3.
2 7 This argument appears to be based upon a statement contained in
a 1977 SEC interpretive release addressing entry by investment
companies into repurchase agreements with broker-dealers. See
Securities Trading Practices of Registered Investment Companies:
General Statement of Policy, Investment Company Act Release No.
10,666 (Apr. 18, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 25,128. See also Investment Trust
Study, Section IV.C.. supra note 22.
10
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Company Act or the preamble to the Act to support the
Commission's position. In fact, as noted above, except for
certain restrictions imposed on diversified investment
companies, the Investment Company Act has permitted all
types of investment companies since its inception to
engage directly in the securities underwriting business
and, therefore, directly to expose all or a substantial
portion of their assets to the entrepreneurial risks
associated with such businesses. Therefore, it seems
unlikely that Congress principally was concerned with the
more indirect exposure of such assets to entrepreneurial
risks through investments in partnerships.
The lack of support in the record for this argument,
however, has not prevented the Commission or its staff
from tendering it on numerous subsequent occasions. 28
3. Reciprocal Practices
In the release proposing rule 12d3-1, the Commission
put forth another rationale for the enactment of section
12(d)(3). The SEC argued that section 12(d)(3)'s practical
effect is to "eliminate the possibility of certain reciprocal
practices between investment companies and securities
related businesses."29 These reciprocal practices "include
the possibility that an investment company might
purchase securities or other interests in a broker-dealer
for selling fund shares, rather than solely on investment
merit. Similarly, the staff has expressed concern that an
investment company might direct brokerage to a broker-
dealer in which the company has invested to enhance the
broker-dealer's profitability or to assist it during financial
difficulty, even though that broker-dealer may not offer the
best price and execution."30
There do not appear to be any statements in the section
12(d)(3) legislative history, the general legislative history of
2 See, e.g., Investment Company Act Release No. 19,716, supra
note 4.2 9 JL
30 Id
11
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the Investment Company Act or the preamble to the Act to
support the argument that section 12(d)(3) was designed
to prevent investment companies from engaging in
reciprocal practices. Perhaps this is because these
practices can be adequately addressed elsewhere. For
example, the Conduct Rules of the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc., expressly prohibit broker-dealer
member firms from conditioning the sale of investment
company shares on the receipt of brokerage
commissions.3 1
4. Liquidity
The Commission also has argued that "Congress in
prohibiting investment in securities related businesses
under Section 12(d)(3) was apparently concerned, among
other things, with an investment company's maintaining
the liquidity of its portfolio."32 This perhaps is the least
supportable argument that the SEC has formulated to
date to explain the underlying purpose of section 12(d)(3).
First, there is nothing in the legislative history to support
this argument. Second, the prohibitions contained in
section 12(d)(3) apply to all registered investment
companies, while liquidity concerns typically arise solely
in connection with open-end funds that offer redeemable
securities. Finally, those liquidity concerns that do arise in
connection with open-end funds specifically are addressed
in other provisions of the Investment Company Act. 33
31 See NASD Conduct Rule 2830(k).
32 Investment Company Act Release No. 14,036, supra note 7.
- For example, the Commission has interpreted Investment Company
Act section 22(e) to prohibit open-end investment companies from
investing more than 15% of their assets (10% in the case of money
market funds) in illiquid securities. See, e.g., Revisions of Guidelines to
Form N-1A, Investment Company Act Release No. 18,612, 57 Fed. Reg.
9828 (Mar. 12, 1992). Section 22(e) provides that investment companies
may not suspend the right of redemption or postpone the date of
payment more than seven days after a shareholder tenders a security
for redemption. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (1999).
12
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5. Affiliated Transactions
One final argument which has been considered, but
consistently rejected, by the Commission and its staff is
that section 12(d)(3) was principally designed to prohibit
transactions between investment companies and affiliated
persons engaged in securities related businesses. In this
connection, the SEC staff stated in a 1979 report to the
Commission on section 12(d)(3) that
[sluch an interpretation does not comport with the
language of the section, which by its terms applies to
any person who is a broker, dealer, underwriter, or
investment adviser. Moreover, because Section 17(a) of
the Act prohibits affiliated persons of registered
investment companies from selling securities or other
property to such investment companies or their
controlled companies (with certain exceptions not
relevant here), Section 12(d)(3) would be largely
redundant if it were meant to be limited to the securities
of affiliates.3
Ill. STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS
Section 12(d)(3) applies only to transactions wherein a
registered investment company or a company controlled
by such company purchases or otherwise acquires
securities or other interests in a securities related
business. This section summarizes Commission and staff
interpretations pertaining to the concepts of (i) purchasing
or otherwise acquiring, (ii) securities or other interests (iii)
in a securities related business. Interpretations of the
exemptions provided by sections 12(d)(3)(A) and (B) are
also set forth.
3 See Report of the Division of Investment Management RE: Letters
from Certain Securities Industry Firms Requesting Modification of, or
Exemption From, Section 12(d)(3) of the Investment Company Act
of 1940.
13
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A. SECTION 12(d)(3) ELEMENTS
1. Purchase or Otherwise Acquire
The prohibitions of section 12(d)(3) extend not only to
purchases of interests in securities related businesses, but
also to mere acquisitions of such interests. 35 Accordingly,
the Commission has taken the position since 1962 that
the section 12(d)(3) prohibitions apply "not only when a
security or interest is originally purchased or acquired, but
also when investment companies, or controlled companies
thereof, hold an interest in a portfolio company which
thereafter by merger, consolidation, reorganization, ... or
otherwise, acquires an interest in a dealer, broker,
underwriter or investment adviser."3. 6  Therefore,
"investment companies and companies controlled thereby
should take such steps as are necessary to divest
themselves of such prohibited interests within a
reasonable period of time."37  Consistent with this
interpretation the staff has granted no-action relief under
section 12(d)(3) to investment companies unable to
immediately dispose of interests in securities related
business acquired through corporate restructurings due
to circumstances beyond their control and permitted
disposition in a reasonable time period.38
- The Investment Company Act does not define the term "purchase."
However, section 2(a)(34) of the Act defines the term "sale" to include
"every contract of sale or disposition of... a security ... for value." 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(34) (1999).
36Acquisitions of Securities or Interests, Investment Company Act
Release No. 3542, 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 48,189, at 37,131 (Sept.
21, 1962) (hereinafter Investment Company Act Release No. 3542).
37 Id.
m See, e.g., John Hancock Investors, Inc., Investment Company Act
Release No. 9652, 11 SEC Dkt. 1853 (Feb. 23, 1977) (granting
investment companies additional six months to dispose of interest in
securities related business due to difficulty in locating suitable buyer);
American Express Company, SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 1981 (Sept. 19, 1975) (noting investment companies permitted to
dispose of securities of broker-dealer acquired in connection with stock
dividend).
14
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In addition to acquisitions through merger,
reorganization or consolidation, the Commission and its
staff have maintained since 1962 that
[s]ince the prohibition includes both direct and indirect
purchases or other acquisitions of interests in the
businesses mentioned, investment companies should be
especially careful to explore the businesses of companies
in which they are considering acquiring an interest,
including businesses in which such companies, in turn,
have an interest by stock ownership or otherwise. 39
Thus, for example, the SEC staff has indicated that "if an
investment company has any ownership interest in an
investment adviser, it is indirectly engaged in the business
of an investment adviser and, thus, a securities related
business."40 This is so despite the fact that, while section
12(d)(3)'s literal terms extend to any purchase or other
acquisition, they do not purport to extend to mere indirect
investments in securities related businesses.
2. Securities or Other Interests
Section 12(d)(3) imposes broad restrictions on the types
of investments that are prohibited for investment
companies. By its terms, the section prohibits purchases
not only of the more common types of securities, such as
equity and debt securities, but also of any other interest.
The most significant Commission staff interpretations of
this provision of section 12(d)(3) relate to investment
company participation in repurchase agreements.4 1 The
staff, however, also has granted no-action relief under
section 12(d)(3) where an affiliate of an investment adviser
to an investment company has a contingent contractual
obligation to purchase certain fixed income obligations.42
39 Investment Company Act Release No. 3542, supra note 36, at
37,131.4 0 The Korea Fund, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 54,263, at *5
(May 16. 1985).
41 See discussion of repurchase agreements in Part IV.C., infra.
42 SeeThe First National Bank of Chicago, SEC No-Action Letter, 1986
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1709 (Feb. 5, 1986).
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The staff reasoned that the investment company would not
be prohibited from purchasing the bonds for which the
affiliate of its adviser had a contingent contractual
obligation, because the contingent contractual obligation
was sufficiently attenuated so as not to rise to the level of
an "interest" in the adviser's affiliate.
3. Securities Related Businesses
Section 12(d)(3) prohibits investments by investment
companies in interests in "any person who is a broker, a
dealer, is engaged in the business of underwriting, or is
either an investment adviser of an investment company or
an investment adviser registered under Title II of this Act
. ".. -43Each of these entities is discussed in more detail
below.
The term "broker" includes any person "engaged in the
business of effecting transactions in securities for the
account of others, but does not include a bank or any
person solely by reason of the fact that such person is an
underwriter for one or more investment companies."44 The
term "bank" encompasses any banking institution
organized under U.S. law, a member bank of the Federal
Reserve System or any other U.S. banking institution or
trust company a substantial portion of whose business
consists of taking deposits or exercising fiduciary powers
similar to those of national banks.45 The term bank does
not encompass foreign banking institutions. Thus, the
prohibitions of section 12(d)(3) would appear to apply to
acquisitions of interests in any foreign banking institution
that acts as a securities broker.
The term "dealer" encompasses "any person regularly
engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for
his own account, through a broker or otherwise, but does
43 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d)(3) (1999).
44 Investment Company Act section 2(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(6)
(1999).
4 SeeInvestment Company Act section 2(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(5)
(1999).
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not include a bank, insurance company, or investment
company, or any person insofar as he is engaged in
investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities, or in owning
or holding securities, for his own account, either
individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but not as a
regular business. ' '46 The term "insurance company" is
defined to include any entity organized as an "insurance
company, whose primary and predominant business
activity is the writing of insurance or the reinsuring of
risks ... and which is subject to supervision by the
insurance commissioner ... of a State."47
An "underwriter" is broadly defined as "any person who
has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or sells for an
issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security,
or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in
any such undertaking, or participates or has a
participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any
such undertaking."8
The term "investment adviser to an investment
company" encompasses any investment adviser to an
investment company registered with the Commission
under the Investment Company Act. It does not
encompass acquisitions of interests in issuers that act as
adviser only to entities excluded from the definition of
investment company under section 3(c) of the Act or
exempted from registration under section 6(c) of the Act.
For example, it does not encompass providing investment'
advice only to entities excluded from the definition of
investment company under Investment Company Act
section 3(c)(1)49 because they have 100 or fewer investors
and do not propose to make a public offering of their
securities.
46 Investment Company Act section 2(a)(1 1). 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(1 1)
(1999).
4 7 Investment Company Act section 2(a)(17), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(17)
(1999).
48 Investment Company Act section 2(a)(40), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(40)
(1999).
49 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(I) (1999).
17
Stadulis and Levin: SEC Regulation of Investment Company Investments in Securities Re
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
26 VILLANOVA JOURNAL OF LAW AND INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
The Commission adopted Investment Company Act rule
2a-3 in 1944 to exclude certain banks from the definition
of "investment adviser" of an investment company for
purposes of section 12(d)(3).50 As a result, the rule
permitted investment companies to acquire securities and
other interests in banks that served as investment
advisers to investment companies other than those
seeking to rely on the rule. The Commission rescinded rule
2a-3 in 1984 when it adopted rule 12d3-1. 51
. Finally, an "investment adviser registered under Title II
of this Act" refers to any investment adviser registered with
the Commission under the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 ("Investment Advisers Act"). The SEC staff has
indicated that the prohibitions of section 12(d)(3) do not
apply to acquisitions of interests in lawfully unregistered
investment advisers to unregistered investment
companies, such as interests in foreign investment
advisers to foreign unregistered investment companies. 52
B. SECTIONS 12(d)(3)(A) AND (B)
Sections 12(d)(3)(A) and (B) exempt from the prohibitions
of Section 12(d)(3) transactions in which one or more
investment companies acquire securities of a wholly
owned corporation (i) primarily engaged in the business of
underwriting and distributing securities issued by other
persons, selling securities to customers, or any one or
more of these or related activities, and (ii) whose gross
income normally is derived principally from these
activities.
The Commission and its staff have provided very little
guidance concerning the scope of the exemption provided
by sections 12(d)(3)(A) and (B). This undoubtedly is
attributable, in part, to the fact that very few investment
companies have sought to form wholly-owned
5, See Investment Company Act Release No. 606, 1944 WL 5003, at *2
(Jan. 5, 1944).
51 Investment Company Act Release No. 4044, supra note 6.
52Royce Value Fund (Jan. 24, 1995).
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underwriting subsidiaries in reliance on this exemption. In
fact, as of the date of publication of this article, there
appears to be only a single investment company complex
that currently wholly-owns and operates an underwriting
subsidiary. Moreover, this complex, the Vanguard Group,
technically was unable to rely on sections 12(d)(3)(A) and
(B) because the subsidiary was not primarily engaged in
the business of underwriting securities of other persons.
Rather, the subsidiary's principal function is to provide
"management, administrative and marketing services on
an at-cost basis to the funds."53 Consequently, this
complex has sought and obtained SEC exemptive relief
from section 12(d)(3) and certain other Investment
Company Act provisions to organize and operate the
subsidiary.4
IV. INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT RULE 12d3-1
A. INTRODUCTION
The Commission adopted Investment Company Act rule
12d- 1 in 1964 to provide an exemption for investment
company acquisitions of securities or other interests in
issuers that derived no more than 15% of their gross
revenues from securities related businesses.5 5 Unlike rule
2a-3, this exemption was not limited to acquisitions of
bank securities or interests.
53See Access Vanguard. A Unique Corporate Structure (visited Feb.
21, 2000) <http://www.vanguard.com/about/1_3_1.html>.
s See, e.g., In the Matter of Vanguard Group, Inc., Investment
Company Act Release Nos. 9616, 11 SEC Dkt. 1538 (Jan. 19, 1977)
(notice) and 9664, 11 SEC Dkt. 1973 (Mar. 4, 1977) (order).
55 See Investment Company Act Release No. 4044, supra note 6.
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The Commission redesignated rule 12d-1 as rule 12d3-1
in 1984 and made a number of significant revisions to the
rule. Most notably, it added an additional exemption from
section 12(d)(3) for investment company acquisitions of
securities or other interests in issuers that derive more
than 15% of their gross revenues from securities related
activities. To rely on the new exemption, investment
companies had to meet certain quantitative and
qualitative conditions. In light of the new exemption, the
SEC concurrently rescinded rule 2a-3.
Finally, the Commission substantively amended rule
12d3-1 in 1993 to remove the qualitative conditions that
investment companies had to meet to acquire securities or
other interests in issuers that derive more than 15% of
their gross revenues from securities related activities. The
remainder of this section examines the substantive
provisions of rule 12d3-1, Commission and staff
interpretations under the rule and other relevant
exemptions and interpretations under the section and
rule.
B. RULE 12d3-1
1. Securities Related Activities
Rule 12d3-1 conditionally exempts from the prohibitions
of section 12(d)(3) investment company acquisitions of
securities issued by persons engaged in securities related
activities. "Securities related activities" are defined as "a
person's activities as a broker, a dealer, an underwriter, an
investment adviser registered under the Investment
Advisers Act, as amended, or as an investment adviser to a
registered investment company."5 6
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the rule expressly
provides that it does not exempt "the acquisition of a
general partnership interest or a security issued by the
acquiring company's investment adviser, promoter, or
principal underwriter, or any affiliated person of such
56 Investment Company Act rule 12d3-1(d)(1), 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.12d3-1(d)(1) (1999).
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investment adviser, promoter, or principal underwriter. '" 57
The term "affiliated person" is broadly defined in the
Investment Company Act to include all of the following:
(i) any person owning 5% or more of an investment
company's outstanding voting securities; (ii) any person
5% or more of whose outstanding voting securities an
investment company owns; (iii) any person who controls, is
controlled by, or is under common control with, an
investment company; (iv) any investment adviser to an
investment company; and (v) any officer, director, partner
or co-partner or employee of an investment company.
58
Thus, rule 12d3-1 does not provide an exemption from
section 12(d)(3) for the acquisition of securities of affiliated
persons of investment advisers, promoters and principal
underwriters, even if such persons are not engaged in a
securities related business. However, since the section
does not prohibit such acquisitions, no exemption from
the section for such acquisitions is necessary.
2. Acquisitions
Rule 12d3-1(d)(7) provides that, subject to limitation
under the rule, the following transactions "will not be
deemed to be an acquisition of securities of a securities
related business":
(i) the receipt of stock dividends on securities
acquired in accordance with the terms of the
section;
(ii) the receipt of securities arising from a stock-for-
stock split on securities acquired in accordance
with the terms of the rule;
(iii) the exercise of options, warrants or rights acquired
in accordance with the terms of the section; and
(iv) the conversion of convertible securities acquired in
accordance with the terms of the rule.
57 Investment Company Act rule 12d3-1(c), 17 C.F.R. § 270.12d3-1(c)
(1999).
8 Investment Company Act section 2(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3)
(1999).
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In addition to the foregoing,59 rule 12d3-1 expressly
provides that, under certain circumstances, investment
company acquisitions of "demand features" or
"guarantees," as those terms are defined under
Investment Company Act rule 2a-7(a)(8) and (a)(15),60 will
not be deemed to be acquisitions of securities of securities
related businesses subject to the rule.6' An investment
company may rely on this exemption regardless of whether
it is organized and operated as a money market fund
under rule 2a-7. 62 The beneficial effect of this provision is
to permit broker-dealers and banks to lend credit support
and liquidity to issuers seeking to sell securities eligible for
purchase by investment companies.
The term "demand feature" is defined in rule 2a-7 to
include any "feature permitting the holder of a security to
sell the security at an exercise price equal to the
approximate amortized cost of the security plus accrued
interest, if any, at the time of exercise."6 3 A demand feature
59 17 C.F.R. §270.12d3-1(d)(7) (1999).
60 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.2a-7(a)(8) and 270.2a-7(a)(15) (1999).
61 17 C.F.R. § 270.12d3-1(d)(7)(v) (1999).
6The Commission proposed an amendment to rule 12d3-1 in 1985
that would have limited this exemption solely to money market funds
relying on Investment Company Act rule 2a-7. See Acquisition and
Valuation of Certain Portfolio Instruments, Investment Company Act
Release No. 14,607 [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,795, at 87,545 (July 1, 1985). However, the SEC redrafted the
provision so that the "final amendment applies to all types of
investment companies." See Acquisition and Valuation of Certain
Portfolio Instruments, Investment Company Act Release No. 14,983
[1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,972, at
88,047 (Mar. 12, 1986). Although this exemption has been amended
from time to time since 1986, none of the amendments have sought to
limit its scope to money market funds relying on Investment Company
Act rule 2a-7. See Delegation of Authority to Director of Division of
Investment Management, Investment Company Act Release No. 18,005
[1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,716, at
81,379 (Feb. 20, 1991); Revisions to Rules Regulating Money Market
Funds, Investment Company Act Release No. 21,837 [1995-1996
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,745, at 87,615 (Mar. 21,
1996); Technical Revisions to the Rules and Forms Regulating Money
Market Funds, Investment Company Act Release No. 22,921 [1997
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,793, at 89,980 (Dec. 3,
1997) (hereinafter Investment Company Act Release No. 22,921).
6 Investment Company Act rule 2a-7(a)(8), 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(a)(8)
(1999).
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must be exercisable either at any time on no more than 30
calendar days' notice or at specified intervals not
exceeding 397 calendar days and upon no more than 30
calendar days' notice.64
The term "guarantee" is defined in rule 2a-7 as "an
unconditional obligation of a person other than the issuer
of the security to undertake to pay, upon presentment by
the holder of the guarantee (if required), the principal
amount of the underlying security plus accrued interest
when due or upon default."65 The Commission has stated
that this term "would include a wide-range of
arrangements designed to unconditionally support the
credit of the issuer of the security.' '66 Thus, for example,
the term would encompass unconditional puts, letters of
credit or financial guarantee (bond) insurance.6 7
For purposes of the exemption in rule 12d3-1(d)(7), a
demand feature or guarantee is considered to be acquired
from the entity to whom the investment company looks for
payment of the exercise price. In addition, with respect to
75% of an investment company's assets immediately after
acquisition, no more than 10% of the company's total
assets may consist of securities with underlying demand
features or guarantees from the same institution.
3. Exemption for Companies Deriving 15% or
Less of Their Revenues from Securities
Related Activities
Rule 12d3-1(a)68 provides that, notwithstanding section
12(d)(3), a registered investment company or any company
that the investment company controls "may acquire any
security issued by any person that, in its most recent fiscal
year, derived 15 percent or less of its gross revenues from
securities related activities unless the acquiring company
64 See i&L
6 Investment Company Act rule 2a-7(a)(15), 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.2a-7(a)(15) (1999).
6Investment Company Act Release No. 22,921, supra note 62, at
89,982.
6 See i&.
68 17 C.F.R. § 270.12d3-1(a) (1999):
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would control such person after the acquisition." This
provision enables an investment company to purchase
securities of issuers which are not engaged in securities
related activities, but only to an extent that, in the view of
the Commission, does not warrant the protection afforded
by section 12(d)(3).
To determine whether a particular issuer meets the 15%
or less gross revenue test, an investment company must
count the issuer's gross revenues from its own direct
securities related activities as well as its "ratable share of
the securities related activities of enterprises of which it
owns 20 percent or more of the voting or equity interest."69
In addition, the Commission has stated that
[wihere an issuer is a subsidiary of a corporation
engaged direct [sic] or indirectly in securities related
activities, and an investment company knows or has
reason to know that the proceeds of securities issued by
the subsidiary are to be used to finance the business
operations of the parent or its other subsidiaries, then
the subsidiary's securities would be deemed to be issued
by the parent. The acquisition of such securities would
be prohibited under Section 12(d)(3), and would be
exempted under [Rule 12d3-1] only to the extent that
securities issued directly by the parent corporation
would be eligible for purchase under the rule.7 0
In making the foregoing determinations, an investment
company must look to "the issuer's annual report to
shareholders, the issuer's annual reports or registration
statement filed with the Commission or the issuer's chief
financial officer." 71
Compliance with these conditions is required only at the
time of acquisition. Thus, the Commission has said that "if
69 Investment Company Act rule 12d3-1(d)(2), 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.12d3-1(d)(2) (1999).
70 Exemption for Acquisition by Registered Investment Companies,
Investment Company Act Release No. 13,725, [1983-1984 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,479, at 86,540 n. 18 (Jan. 17,
1984).
71 Investment Company Act rule 12d3-1(d)(2), 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.12d3-1(d)(2) (1999).
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a company were to rely on the blanket exemption in
acquiring securities from an issuer that derived 15% or
less of its gross revenues from securities related activities,
and a year later that issuer's revenues from such activities
exceeded 15%, the company could continue to hold those
securities in reliance on the blanket exemption."72 Of
course, the company could not increase its holdings of
such securities, however, except in transactions that are
not deemed to involve the acquisition of securities of a
securities related business.
Finally, the investment company may not control the
issuer as a result of the acquisition. Thus, as a practical
matter, it may not acquire more than 25% of the
outstanding voting securities of the issuer. A "voting
security" is defined in section 2(a)(42) of the Investment
Company Act as "any security presently entitling the
owner or holder thereof to vote for the election of directors
of a company."73 Thus, the rule's terms do not prohibit an
investment company from acquiring more than 25% of the
securities of an issuer if such securities are non-voting
securities.
4. Exemption for Companies Deriving More
than 15% of Their Gross Revenues
from Securities Related Activities
Rule 12d3-1(b)74 provides that, notwithstanding section
12(d)(3), an acquiring company may acquire a security
issued by a person that, in its most recent fiscal year,
derived more than 15% of its gross revenues from
securities related activities as long as the following
conditions are met.
First, immediately after the acquisition of any security,
the acquiring company may not have invested "more than
5 percent of the value of its total assets in the securities of
the issuer."75
7 2 Investment Company Act Release No. 13,725, supra note 3.
73 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(42) (1999).
74 17 C.F.R. § 270.12d3-1(b) (1999).75 Investment Company Act rule 12d3-1(b)(3), 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.12d3-1(b)(3) (1999).
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Second, the three day safe harbor for purchases of
securities of a single issuer in excess of 5% provided under
rule 2a-7 may not be relied upon to exceed the 5%
limitation imposed by rule 12d3-1.78
Third, immediately after acquiring any equity security,
the acquiring company may not own more than "five
percent of the outstanding securities of that class of the
issuer's equity securities. 7 7 "Equity security" for these
purposes is defined to include
any stock or similar security ... limited partnership
interest, interest in a joint venture, or certificate of
interest in a business trust; or any security convertible,
with or without consideration into such a security, or
carrying any warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase such a security; or any such warrant or right;
or any put, call, straddle or other option or privilege of
buying such a security from or selling such a security to
another without being bound to do so. 78
The determination of the percentage of an acquiring
company's ownership interest of a class of outstanding
equity securities of an issuer must be determined in
accordance with rules adopted by the Commission under
section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Securities Exchange Act"). Rule 16a-1 under the
Securities Exchange Act contains two definitions of the
term "beneficial owner." One definition is used "solely for
the purpose of determining whether a person is a
beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any class of
equity securities 79 and the other is used for all other
76 See Short-Term Investments Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS (Nov. 8, 1994).
77Investment Company Act rule 12d3-1(b)(1), 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.12d3-1(b)(1) (1999).78 Investment Company Act rule 12d3- 1 (d)(3) (incorporating definition
of "equity security' from rule 3al 1 under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Securities Exchange Act"), 17 C.F.R. § 240.3ai 1), 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.12d3-1(d)(3) (1999).
79 Securities Exchange Act rule 16a-1(a)(1), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.16a-l(a)(1) (1999).
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purposes under section 16.80 Rule 16a-1 does not specify
whether an investment company must look to one or both
of these definitions for the purpose of determining its
ownership interest in an issuer engaged in securities
related activities. However, in interpreting another rule
provision under the Investment Company Act that
incorporates the section 16 rules, the Commission staff
concluded that the second definition would be used.8
Presumably, the same conclusion should apply for
purposes of interpreting rule 12d3-1.
Fourth, immediately after the acquisition of any debt
security, the acquiring company may not own "more than
10 percent of the outstanding principal amount of the
issuer's debt securities."'8 2 "Debt securities" include "all
securities other than equity securities."83 Investment
companies seeking to acquire options, warrants, rights or
convertible securities of securities related businesses in
reliance on rule 12d3-1 generally must assume that such
instruments have been exercised at the time of acquisition
for purposes of this exemption. One interesting effect of
this requirement is that the Commission staff has agreed
that cash settled options issued by broker-dealers may be
treated as fixed income securities under rule 12d3-1. 84 In
permitting the fund to treat cash settled options as fixed
income securities, the staff relied on representations that,
although the value of the options is based on the value of
an equity security or a basket of equity securities, the
options would at no time "carry any right that typically
accompanies an equity security, such as the right to vote
or the right to dividends. Rather, they represent only a
contractual right to receive a payment if the option is 'in
80 Securities Exchange Act rule 16a- 1(a)(2), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.16a-1(a)(2) (1999).
81 Investment Company Institute, SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 966 (July 31, 1991).
8 2Investment Company Act rule 12d3-1(b)(2), 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.12d3-1(b)(2) (1999).
83 Investment 'Company Act rule 12d3-1(d)(4), 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.12d3-1(d)(4) (1999).
84 See Dreyfus Capital Growth Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 958 (Sept. 16, 1992).
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the money' when exercised."85 Since such options would
not be viewed as equity securities, the definition of fixed
income security provided by rule 12d3-1(d)(4) requires
that they be treated as fixed income securities.
C. REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS
In a typical investment company repurchase transaction
("repo"), the investment company purchases securities
from a broker, a dealer or a bank and agrees to resell those
securities to the same party at a stated higher price on an
agreed-upon date, often as soon as the next day. In
economic reality, the repo transaction functions much like
a loan by the investment company to the selling broker,
dealer or bank secured by the securities transferred to the
investment company. Since a repo agreement with a
broker or dealer may be construed as the acquisition of an
interest in that broker or dealer, the Commission staff has
interpreted section 12(d)(3) and rule 12d3-1 as prohibiting
investment companies from entering into such
transactions. 86 Similarly, where an investment company
enters into a repurchase agreement with a bank that is
engaged in a securities related business, including dealing
in government securities, that transaction may be
construed as the acquisition of an interest in a securities
related business.87
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission staff
historically has taken the position that it will not
recommend enforcement action to the SEC against an
investment company that enters into a repo transaction
with a broker, dealer or bank engaged in a securities
related business, provided that the agreement is fully
collateralized and the issuer is a creditworthy entity (the
"Current Interpretation").8 s The Commission recently
85 Id.
86 Securities Trading Practices of Registered Investment Companies,
Investment Company Act Release No. 10,666 (Apr. 18, 1979), 44 Fed.
Reg. 25 (Apr. 27, 1979).8 7See Investment Company Institute, SEC No-Action Letter, 1985
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2213 (May 7, 1985).
8 Securities Trading Practices of Registered Investment Companies,
Investment Company Act Release No. 13,005, 1983 SEC LEXIS 2494
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proposed Investment Company Act rule 5b-3 to codify this
interpretation. 89
1. Fully Collateralized
Under the Current Interpretation, a repo agreement will
be considered fully collateralized only if the market value
of the securities held as collateral, plus any accrued
interest on those securities, is equal to or greater than the
amount at which the broker, dealer or bank will
repurchase the securities or repay the principal amount
borrowed plus interest accrued on the principal amount
borrowed ("repurchase price"). The market value of the
securities held as collateral must be marked to the market
dafly during the entire term of the agreement and the repo
agreement should provide that additional collateral will be
required from the broker, dealer or bank if the market
value of the securities falls below the repurchase price.
In addition, the staff will consider a repo agreement to be
fully collateralized only if the investment company has
acquired actual or constructive possession of the
collateral. Constructive possession includes the transfer of
United States government securities by book-entry. Where
the collateral is not held in the possession of the
investment company or its custodian, the collateral must
be held by a third party which is eligible to serve as a
custodian under the Investment Company Act and which
has verified that the collateral is being held for the
investment company.
(Feb. 2, 1983). In this regard, a note following the text of Investment
Company Act rule 12d3-1 currently states that "[it is not intended that
this rule should supersede" the staffs no-action position pertaining to
repo agreements.
89 Treatment of Repurchase Agreements and Refunded Securities as
an Acquisition of the Underlying Securities, Investment Company Act
Release No. 24,050 (Sept. 23, 1999). The Proposed Rule also would
allow a fund to treat a repo agreement as an acquisition of the
underlying collateral in determining whether it is in compliance with
the investment criteria for diversified funds set forth in Investment
Company Act section 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b)(1) (1999).
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Under the90 Proposed 91 Rule, a repo agreement will be
considered "fully collateralized" if the following conditions
are met:
(i) the value of the securities collateralizing the
repurchase agreement (reduced by the transaction
costs (including loss of interest) that the
investment company reasonably could expect to
incur if the seller defaults) is, and during the entire
term of the repo agreement remains, at least equal
to the resale price provided in the agreement;
(ii) the investment company has perfected its security
interest in the collateral;
(iii) the collateral is maintained with the investment
company's custodian or a third party that qualifies
as a custodian under the Investment Company
Act;
(iv) the collateral consists entirely of cash items,
United States government securities or other
securities that at the time the repo agreement is
entered into are rated in the highest rating
category by the Requisite NRSROs; and
(v) upon an event of insolvency with respect to the
seller, the repurchase agreement would qualify
under a provision of applicable insolvency law
providing an exclusion from any automatic stay of
creditors' rights against the seller.
90 Proposed Rule 5b-3(c)(7) would define the term "resale price" as the
acquisition price paid to the seller of the securities, plus the accrued
resale premium on such acquisition. The accrued resale premium is the
amount specified in the repo agreement or the amortization of the
difference between the acquisition price and the resale price specified in
the repo agreement.
91 Proposed Rule 5b-3(c)(6) would define the term "requisite NRSRO"
as any two nationally recognized statistical rating organizations that
have issued a rating with respect to a security or class of debt
obligations of an issuer, or if only one nationally recognized statistical
rating organization has issued a rating with respect to such security or
class of debt obligations of an issuer at the time the investment
company acquires the security, that NRSRO.
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The term "event of insolvency" means, with respect to a
person, one of the following:
(i) an admission of insolvency, the application by the
person for the appointment of a trustee, receiver,
rehabilitator, or similar officer for all or
substantially all of its assets, a general assignment
for the benefit of creditors, the filing by the person
of a voluntary petition in bankruptcy or
application for reorganization or an arrangement
with creditors; or
(ii) the institution of similar proceedings by another
person which are not contested; or
(iii) the institution of similar proceedings by a
government agency responsible for regulating the
activities of the person, whether or not contested
by the person.
2. Creditworthiness
In addition to ensuring that repo agreements are fully
collateralized, the Commission staff has taken the position
that it is necessary for funds to evaluate the
creditworthiness of the brokers, dealers and banks with
whom they propose to enter into repos. The staff
historically took the position that the fund's board of
directors should perform the evaluation of
creditworthiness. In a recent interpretive letter, however,
the staff revised this position to permit a fund's investment
adviser, rather than the fund's board, to evaluate the
creditworthiness of repo counterparties and otherwise
assume primary responsibility for monitoring and
evaluating the fund's use of repo agreements. 92 The
Proposed Rule would formalize the interpretation set forth
in this letter.
In evaluating the creditworthiness of a counterparty the
fund's board or its delegate should determine that the
9 Investment Company Institute, SEC No-Action Letter, [1999
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 77,564, at 78,841 (June 15,
1999).
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counterparty presents no serious risk of becoming
involved in bankruptcy proceedings within the time frame
contemplated by the repo agreement. The staff recognizes
that "the evaluation of the creditworthiness of repo issuers
is a difficult task that may involve subjective judgments as
well as consideration of available financial information. " 93
D. INDEX FUNDS
As noted above, rule 12d3-1 does not exempt the
acquisition of a security issued by the acquiring
investment company's investment adviser, promoter, or
principal underwriter, or any affiliated person of such
persons. This provision has proven particularly
troublesome for investment companies that seek to
replicate the performance of broad based market indices
comprised of securities issued by, among others, a parent
or other affiliated companies of the investment advisers,
promoters or principal underwriters to the investment
companies. For example, in 1990, the Large Company
Index Fund, an investment portfolio of IBM Mutual Funds
requested permission from the Commission staff under
section 12(d)(3) and rule 12d3-1 to invest in shares of
common stock issued by International Business Machines
Corporation, the parent company of the Large Company
Index Fund's investment adviser.94 The Large Company
Index Fund argued that its investment objective was to
replicate the performance of the Standard & Poor's 500
Composite Stock Price Index ("S&P 500") and that the
staffs refusal to permit the acquisition of IBM common
stock would effectively preclude it from acquiring an
integral component of that index. Since 1990, several
other S&P 500 index funds have sought similar relief.95 In
each case, the staff has agreed not to recommend
enforcement action under section 12(d)(3) or rule 12d3-1,
based on the following representations:
93Id
4 See IBM Mutual Funds, SEC No-Action Letter (May 18, 1990).
95 See, e.g., Kidder Peabody Investment Trust, SEC No-Action Letter
[1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,687, at 77,949 (May
14, 1993); Dreyfus Index Fund et al., SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 31,
1992).
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(i) the fund's investment objective is to match the
performance of an unaffiliated, broad-based index;
(ii) the fund will purchase securities of the affiliated
person of its investment adviser, promoter or
principal underwriter and maintain its position in
such securities only in the approximate percentage
that the securities are represented on the index;
and
(iii) any purchase of the securities of an affiliated
person of the fund's investment adviser, promoter
or principal underwriter will comply with the
requirements of rule 12d3-1(a), which permits
investment company acquisitions of securities of
issuers that derived 15% or less of their gross
revenues from securities related businesses.
In contrast, the Commission staff has declined to grant
no-action relief under section 12(d)(3) or rule 12d3-1 to
index funds that seek to acquire securities of affiliated
persons of their investment advisers, promoters or
principal underwriters in percentages that differ from
those that the securities represent on the index. Thus, for
example, the staff declined to grant no-action relief to
permit a series of unit investment trusts to invest 10% of
their assets in each of the ten stocks in the Dow Jones
Industrial Average with the highest dividend yields where
one or more of the securities could be securities issued by
affiliated persons of the trust sponsors.96
Having stated its views concerning the application of
section 12(d)(3) and rule 12d3-1 to index fund acquisitions
of securities of investment adviser, promoter and principal
underwriter affiliates, the Commission staff has concluded
that it will no longer respond to no-action requests in this
area unless they present novel issues.97
96 Defined Asset Funds et al., SEC No-Action Letter [1992-1993
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 76,430, at 77,355 (Aug. 17,
1992).
9 7 The Victory Stock Index Fund, SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 7, 1995).
It is interesting to note that, in 1993, one commentator requested that
the SEC consider amending Investment Company Act rule 12d3-1 "to
permit a fund to invest its portfolio assets in a manner designed to
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E. MONEY MARKET FUNDS
As noted above, the Commission staff historically has
taken the position that investment companies may not
enter into a repo agreement with a broker, dealer or bank
engaged in securities related activities unless the
agreement is fully collateralized and the issuer is a
creditworthy entity. In conjunction with its recent
proposed adoption of Investment Company Act rule 5b-3,
the Commission also proposed amending rule 2a-7 to
require a fund's board of directors or the board's delegate
to evaluate the counterparty's creditworthiness. 98 In
addition, the proposed rule would amend the current
definition of "collateralized fully" under rule 2a-7 to cross
reference the one set forth in proposed Investment
Company Act rule 5b-3,99 because the definition set forth
in the proposed rule is virtually identical to the one
currently contained in rule 2a-7.100
V. ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS
There do not appear to be any federal or state court
cases to date involving section 12(d)(3) or rule 12d3-1.
However, the Commission has instituted enforcement
proceedings for violations of the section or rule on at least
five occasions. 101 Most recently, the Commission instituted
proceedings in 1985 against an investment adviser to a
registered investment company and an officer of the
replicate a nationally recognized index." Investment Company Act
Release No. 19,716, supra note 4. The SEC stated at that time that it
"believes this Is worthy of further examination, but is not within the
scope of the proposed amendments. Accordingly, the Commission is not
taking action on the commentor's proposal in this rulemaking." Id.
9 8 See Proposed Rule 2a-7(c)(4)(ii).
99 Proposed Rule 2a-7(a)(5).
10 See Investment Company Act rule 2a-7(a)(5), 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.2a-7(a)(5).
10' See, e.g., In the Matter of John H. Lambert et al., Investment
Company Act Release No. 10,945 (Nov. 19, 1979); In the Matter of
American General Capital Management, Inc., Investment Company Act
Release No. 10,131 (Feb. 23, 1978); In the Matter of James T. Bakos,
Investment Company Act Release No. 7469 (Nov. 6, 1972); In the Matter
of Chandler Management Corp., Investment Company Act Release No.
7331 (Aug. 17, 1972).
34
Villanova Journal of Law and Investment Management, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vjlim/vol2/iss1/2
(VOL. 2:9 2000) SEC REGULATION OF INVESTMENTS 43
adviser for causing the fund to purchase a "subordinated
debenture issued by a corporation which derived more
than 15% of its total gross revenues from the business of
being a broker, dealer or underwriter."10 2 This proceeding
occurred prior to adoption of the amendments to rule
12d3-1 permitting investments in securities related
businesses that derived more than 15% of their gross
revenues from securities related activities subject to a 5%
limitation.
VI. CONCLUSION
As noted at the beginning of this article, the first and
perhaps most fundamental canon of statutory
construction is that "when language is clear and
unambiguous it must be held to mean what it plainly
expresses."'0 3 For the most part, the Comnission and its
staff have adhered to this canon admirably in interpreting
and applying section 12(d)(3). Moreover, they have shown
flexibility and creativity in administering section 12(d)(3)
and rule 12d3-1 in light of the many fundamental changes
to the securities markets since 1940. Most recently, this
has centered on proposed Investment Company Act rule
5b3-1, which would codify and update the Commission
staff positions pertaining to investments in repurchase
agreements.
At the same time, the Commission and its staff have
disregarded the literal terms of rule 12d3-1 in one
important area - they have interpreted and applied
section 12(d)(3) to acquisitions of interests in securities
related businesses through indirect ownership. This
interpretation undoubtedly was prompted by the fact that
Congress intended the Investment Company Act to prevent
investment companies from being "organized, operated,
managed, or their portfolio securities selected in the
interests of brokers, dealers, underwriters, and investment
advisers."*° Unfortunately, it is inconsistent with another
102 In the Matter of Van Cleef, Jordan & Wood, Investment Company
Act Release No. 14,517 (May 15, 1985).
10 3 SeeSUTHERIAND, supra note 9, at § 81.
104 Investment Company Act Release No. 13,725, supra note 3.
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important canon of statutory construction - that the
literal terms of a statute should be disregarded only "if the
plain meaning of the words of the statute is at variance
with the policy of the statute or if there is a clearly
expressed legislative intention contrary to the language of
the statute."'0 5
As noted above, the legislative history is virtually silent
concerning the intended policy and scope of section
12(d)(3). While the SEC and its staff have advanced several
arguments to explain the policy and purpose of the
section, only one of the arguments is somewhat persuasive
- that section 12(d)(3) was designed to prevent investment
companies from directly engaging in diverse financial
enterprises.
In light of the paucity of section 12(d)(3) legislative
history and the inherent weaknesses in most of the
explanations for that section by the Commission and its
staff, it is difficult to conclude that the interpretation
discussed is warranted. A plain reading of section 12(d)(3)
certainly does not warrant such a conclusion, nor does the
legislative history.
105 See SUTHERLAND, supra note 9, at § 81.
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